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I The significance of fertility for C anada's social and 
economic future 
The rate of fertility has fallen so low in Canada that 
the replacement of the present generation is no longer 
assured. Canadians now have fewer chiidren, later in 
their lives and more may choose to forgo parenthood 
altogether. Changes of unprecedented proportions are 
taking place in the dynamics of population growth, the 
age structure and family and household formation. 
Fertility is the single most important demographic 
factor underlying these changes. Neither mortality 
nor migration, the other two components of population 
growth, have had a comparable influence. (Romaniuc, 
1984:7) 
While these dramatic changes are of considerable interest to 
demographers concerned with the study of fertility levels, trends 
and differentials, their relationship to the social and economic 
future of the larger Canadian society is perhaps less obvious. It 
is the purpose of this paper to highlight these interrelation- 
ships, focusing particularly on the links between fertility 
behaviour and the labour force and the critical issues these 
entail for future planning and policy-making in Canada. 
As Romaniuc notes, fertility influences the social and 
economic composition of Canadian soc ie ty through the mediation of 
three main variables: population growth, the age structure and 
family and household formation. The following example 
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illustrates the importance of fertility in determining population 
growth in Canada. During the baby boom of the 1950's and early 
1960's, when births averaged between 3-4 children per woman the 
population grew at exceptionally high rates: approximately 3% per 
year. Conversely, recent low fertility levels of about 1.7 
births per woman are reflected in Canad a's current low growth 
rate of just over 1% per year. Levels of population growth, and 
fluctuations therein, largely determine the volume of demand for 
employment, housing, education, health and other social and 
economic benefits. 
Canada's baby boom generation, aptly referred to by Kettle 
(1980) as the "big generation", also illustrates how a 
population' s age structure influences social and economic 
conditions. From 1917-1947, the number of children reaching 
school age each year was fairly consistent, fluctuating between 
235,000 and 265, 000. Thereafter it began to grow steadily, 
doubling in size within 20 years. Schools and related 
educational services were rapidly expanded to accommodate the 
increased demand with, apparently, the implicit assumption that 
growth, both demographic and economic, would continue 
indefinitely. A return to lower fertility in the last two 
decades has created an abnormal "bulge" in the age structure and 
an attendant sharp decline in the need for schools and other 
educational services. Further social and economic shocks have 
been, and will continue to be, felt as the "big generation" 
passes through the various phases of its life-cycle. 
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Changes in the family and household formation are also 
affected by fertility insofar as the latter is the major 
determinant of family size and the age structure of the family. 
The number of children and the timing of child-bearing also 
affect the gap between generations, and hence the economic 
activities of the family members, particularly women. 
Considerable research on Canadian fertility patterns, trends 
and differentials has been conducted in recent years. This has 
been made possible because of the availability of census 
information, birth records and a number of regional fertilty 
studies. Moreover, a Canada-wide fertility survey has recently 
been com pleted, and the data should be available for public use 
within the next year. In spite of this solid knowledge base in 
the area of fertility research, many important issues have 
received scant attention in this country. Among these are the 
effects of fertility and population growth on labour force 
characteristics. 
In Section II (a) of this paper the relationships between 
fertility and the labour force are discussed in some detail, 
focusing mainly on fertility as an independent determinant of 
labour force variables through its effects on population growth 
and age structure. A detailed discussion of the relationships 
between fertility and family and household formation per se would 
take us beyond the scope of this paper. However, where labour 
force issues are affected by family and household formation 
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behaviour, as in the content of the following sections, these 
interrelationships are highlighted. Section II (b) discusses 
another important aspect of the fertility - labour force link, 
namely, the relationship between child-bearing on female labour 
force participation. Section III (a) discusses the future 
Canadian fertility outlook, based upon what is indicated by 
recent research. Finally, Section III (b) discusses the policy 
implications of future fertility patterns, including their impact 
upon employment opportunities and labour market conditions. Much 
of what is said in Section III is tentative, based upon 
speculation concerning future Canadian fertility patterns. 
However, the analysis should at least demonstrate the need for 
greater consideration, in both public and private spheres, of the 
potential consequences of alternative family size choices of 
present and future generations. 
II (a) Fertility and the labour force 
Changes in population are among the principal factors which 
determine and alter em ployment opportunities. Changes in a 
population's size and composition cause changes in the amount and 
types of goods and services demanded which, in turn, alter the 
size and characteristics of the labour force, including the 
amount of competition for jobs in an occupation. 
The level of fertility is an important determinant of the 
size of the future labour force or the labour supply. This 
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relationship is so obvious that it needs little elaboration but 
can be seen easily by the heavy competition for jobs in the 
1970's and 1980's resuiting from the large number of people born 
during the 1950's and early 1960's. 
Canada's population growth which, as already noted, is 
largely determined by fertility, is intricately connected with 
growth in the labour force, and hence with economic growth. The 
basic relationship between labour force and population is the 
labour force participation rate which is defined as the ratio of 
the labour force to the source population for any age-sex group. 
Canada' s popualtion growth has historically closely matched the 
growth in the labour force, as has been demonstrated by Foot 
(1982). Foot also shows that, over the 1966-1979 period, 
population growth accounted for 3/4 of labour force growth. 
Increases in labour force participation, especially of women, 
were substantial, yet they accounted for only 1/4 of total 
growth. Hence, fertility, as the major determinant of population 
growth, continues to be a critical factor in the growth, as well 
as the size, of the Canadian labour force. 
Changes in fertility also affect the age structure of the 
population, the age structure of the labour force and hence, 
labour mobility. To continue the example of the big generation, 
just as its entry into the labour force was plagued by fierce 
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competition for entry level jobs, so will be its opportunities 
for career advancement as it struggles to contend with the 
reduced number of jobs left vacant by the smaller cohorts 
preceding it. Solutions may be sought through part-time work, 
job-sharing and reduced work weeks, all of which can be 
encountered in Canada today. Such strains should be considerably 
eased for the smaller cohort of post baby boom workers presently 
entering the labour market. 
Imbalances in the age structure of the labour force also 
affect the hiring flexibility of industries and organizations to 
attract employees of specified ages. The armed forces, 
government bureaucracies, insurance companies and banks, for 
example, seek primarily youthful recruits. The retail trade, 
where a third of employees are under age 25, is likely to 
experience difficulties in recruiting sufficient staff as the 
proportion of the population of young ages declines. (Kettle, 
1980: 161) Since it would be costly to replace young employees 
with older ones, other means such as automation will likely be 
sought by such sectors. 
Age dominates, to a considerable, extent, the kinds of goods 
and services people require, and hence the kinds of industries 
and services which are developed in response to these needs. 
In other words, the age structure of the population influences 
the kinds and quantities of goods and services demanded. A large 
proportion of young people, for instance, will lead to the 
development of industries geared towards youthful needs and 
tastes. The rapid expansion of the music and games industries in 
Canada over the past few years is a function of the large market 
of teenagers and young adults. Similarly, as the big generation 
ages, its sheer size likely will continue to motivate marketing 
people to produce appropriate products and services specifically 
tailored to its needs. More important, however, will be the 
pressure on public services, especially for health care and 
pensions. 
The age structure of the population also determines the 
proportion of people which will, at any given time, be supported 
by the labour force, or the dependency ratio. In technical 
terms, the dependency ratio is the ratio of the combined child 
and aged population (the "non-productive" or "dependent" 
population) to the intermediate working age population (the 
"productive" or "non-dependent" group). In Canada the working 
age population is generally considered as those aged 15-64. As 
already noted, the proportion of elderly in Canada's population 
(aged 65+) has been increasing (from 5.0% at the turn of the 
century to 8.1% in 1971 and 10.0% in 1983) , and is expected to 
continue to increase, especially if fertility remains close to 
current levels. Thus, the composition of the dependent 
population is changing dramatically, from the young to the 
elderly, and different kinds of demands are likely to be made on 
the working age population as a result. For example, programs 
for the elderly comprise a relatively larger share of Canadian 
8 
government expenditures than those for younger citizens: in 1976, 
per person total government expenditures for those aged 65+ were 
221 times greater than for those in the 0-17 age group. (Foot, 
1982:135 ) Population aging thus has important policy 
implications. It seems inevitable, for instance, that, as the 
population continues to age, there will be a substantially 
increased tax burden on the working age population. 
II (b) Fertility and female labour force participation 
The causal relationship between fertility and female labour 
force participation is somewhat ambig uous. Does child-bearing 
affect women's participation in the work force or vice versa? 
Several studies have shown that a woman's fertility constrains 
her labour force participation. (Bowen and Finegan, 1969; Sweet, 
1972) On the other hand, female labour force participation has 
also been found to be associated with lower fertility. (Bumpass 
and Westoff, 1970; Whelpton et al., 1966) Canadian research on 
these interrelationships is limited, but it does provide some 
interesting insights and questions for further investigation. 
In recent years there has been a marked increase in the 
number of women, both married and unmarried, in the Canadian 
labour force. At present, over 50% of all Canadian women aged 
15-44 are in the work force. The dramatic rise in female labour 
force activity has been attributed to a number of factors: the 
increased availability of effective contraceptive methods, the 
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growth in service sector jobs, increasing divorce, expansion of 
child-care facilities, changes in women's status and educational 
attainments and the availability of labour-saving devices in the 
home. (Robertson and Roy, 1982) The baby boom also played an 
important role insofar as the swelling number of young ad ul ts in 
the past two decades led to a real decline in the wages and 
living standards of youth. Consequently, women entered the work 
force in greater strength, postponing child-bearing, in order to 
maintain family income at acceptable levels. (Robertson and Roy, 
1982; Grindstaff, 1985) 
How has fertility affected this trend? There is some 
evidence that in Canada, like the U.S. studies mentioned above, 
fertility is negatively related to women's labour force 
participation. Using data from Statistics Canada, Grindstaff 
(1985:107) found that over 80% of childless ever-married women 
aged 20-40 were in the labour force compared to about 50% of 
those with children, and childless married women contributed 
about double the amount to family income as women with two or 
more children. "Clearly, children negatively impact both on the 
labour force participation of women and on the level of economic 
contribution provided by women to their families..." (Ibid.:108) 
Kyriazis and Henripin (1982) found that fetility had a strong 
negative effect on the number of years employed among Quebec 
women, although the employment measures used were rather 
imprec ise . 
- 10 - 
The timing of fertility also has important implications for 
labour force participation. Grindstaff (1984) , for example, has 
documented a greater tendency for Canadian women to begin 
child-bearing after the age of 30 than was previously the case, 
and attributes this, among other things, to the importance to 
women of "a period of personal growth without children." 
(Ibid.:103) Child-bearing also creates interruptions in women's 
employment which relates closely to income and status differences 
between men and women. (Breton, 1984; Goyder, 1981) 
While fertility still appears to inhibit labour force 
participation in Canada, contrary evidence is beginning to 
emerge. For example, the labour force participation rate for 
women with children under three years old rose from 31% in 1975 
to 52% in 1984. (Statistics Canada, 1986) Ciuriak and Sims 
(1980) have also documented the increase in participation rates 
among married women over the last five decades. However, it has 
also been repeatedly demonstrated in Canada, as elsewhere, that 
labour force participation has a depressing effect upon fertility 
(Henripin, 1972; Boyd, Eichler and Hofley, 1976; Collishaw, 1976) 
Booth and Duvall (1981) found qualified support for this 
relationship among Toronto women, although not among women who 
perceived themselves as exceptional wives or mothers. Recent 
evidence of the link between labour force participation and 
reduced fertility has been cited in a paper by Rao and 
Balakrishnan (1986) on the basis of data from the Canadian 
Fertility Survey. Women who worked before their first birth 
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delayed this birth more than four years longer than those who did 
not work, and such women also had lower overall fertility than 
those who gave birth earlier. Hence, it is probable that working 
mothers in Canada will have smaller completed family sizes than 
non-working mothers. 
Thus there seems to be circular causal chain linking 
fertility to labour force participation and back to fertility. 
In support of this Cramer (1980) maintains that the causal 
direction is from fertility to labour force participation in the 
short run, and from the latter to the former in the long run. In 
the early years of marriage, a woman's desired family size tends 
to determine her labour force status; in the longer term, 
however, her desire to enter and remain in the work force largely 
influences her family size decisions. Further research in the 
Canadian setting is, however, required before any definitive 
conclusions can be drawn concerning these important 
interrelation- ships. 
III(a) Canada's fertility outlook 
The annual rate of population growth in Canada has declined 
steadily from 3% in 1957 to 1% in the 1980's. Statistics Canada 
(1986) estimates that, if these trends continue, Canada's 
population size will begin to decrease in the 21st century, 
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peaking at just over 28 million by the year 2011.* Many factors 
lend support to the contention that Canadian fertility rates will 
remain low and below the replacement level of 2.1 births per 
woman, at least into the 1990's. These include the following: 
(1) Empirical evidence from demographic data indicate a probable 
continuation of low fertility levels. Grindstaff's (1975, 
1985) research on fertility and childlessness, for example, 
documents pronounced increases in childlessness from 
1971-1981. For example, in 1981, 30% of ever-married women 
aged 25-29 were childless, an increase of 45% from 1971. 
Adolescent fertility was also found to have declined 
dramatically over the 1971-1981 decade. 
(2) The shift towards later ages at first birth among Canadian 
women has already been mentioned. Whereas cohorts in the 
1960's had their first child at 23.5 years on average, women 
in 1980 were waiting until the of age 25. (Romaniuc, 
1984:27) Moreover, there is evidence that intervals between 
births are also increasing. (Ibid.) Both these trends are 
associated with lower fertility. 
*Based on a fertility rate of 1.4 births per woman over her 
lifetime. 
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(3) Changes in marriage patterns are also likely to have a 
depressing effect on fertility. Marriage rates, especially 
among women below the age of 30, have declined considerably 
in recent years. Romaniuc reports a drop in the proportion 
married from 59% to 48% over the 1961-1981 period for women 
aged 20-24, and from 84% to 77% for those 25-29 years old. 
Moreover, there is a much higher incidence of marital 
dissolution: the 1984 divorce rate was six times that of 
1960-62. (Romaniuc, 1984:59; Balakrishnan et al. (1985:1) 
A recent Statistics Canada report indicated that divorces 
had dropped by nearly 5% in 1985, but this may have been due 
to postponement by some couples in order to avail themselves 
of the new law which reduces the period of separation 
required for divorce from three years to one year. (The 
Citizen:1986) Thus, the 1986 statistics should provide a 
more complete picture of the effect of this reform. Lone 
parent families constituted 11% of al l Canadian families in 
1981, 58% of which were the result of marriage breakdown. 
Remarriage has also increased, as have consensual or common 
law unions. While the effect of such marital instability on 
fertility has not been fully demonstrated in Canada, 
American research has shown that it accounted for 16% of the 
decline in the total fertility rate from 1961-1975. 
(Gibson, 1976) 
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(4) The increased availability and adoption of effective 
contraception also makes it easier for couples to have 
exactly the number of children they desire, thus eliminating 
a considerable amount of "excess ferility". For example, 
the Canadian Fertility Survey of 1984 found that 73% of 
currently married women were practicing family planning, 13% 
were preg nan t or in the postpartum period or trying to 
become pregnant, 9% were sterile and only 5% were not using 
any method. Effective methods predominated, especially the 
pill and sterilization. Moreover, women are adopting 
sterilization at ever earlier ages. (Balakrishnan et.al., 
1985) The relative permanency of this method, and the 
inconvenience and uncertainty of reversais, make late 
child-bearing by such women a relatively infrequent event. 
(5) Female labour force participation in Canada, as already 
noted, has been increasing over the past three decades. 
This, as we have seen, is associated with lower fertility. 
This is not to say that women who work will not have 
children; as already mentioned, mothers are an important 
part of today's labour force in Canada. It seems to be 
true, however, that labour force participation puts a brake 
on the number of children a woman has, and hence her total 
fertility will be lower than that of her non-working 
contemporaries. While the costs of having children can be 
reduced by more generous government policies, some of which 
will be discussed in the following section, women will still 
be required to interrupt their careers for substantial 
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periods of time with the birth of each child, and these 
interruptions are likely to assume growing importance as 
women ascend the professional ladder to increasingly 
demanding positions. 
(6) Related to the above are the opportunity costs of 
child-bearing and child-rearing in a society replete with 
alternative goods and services. Grindstaff emphasizes these 
alternatives in discussing why many couples delay having 
children for several years after marriage. "... by having a 
baby later in life, couples get to have it both ways - 
career, travel and education early on in their relationship 
and then a child later." (Grindstaff, 1984:103) More and 
more women are opting for roles beyond exclusive motherhood 
and, at least for the present, smaller families make this 
easiest. 
(7) Finally, economic conditions seem to be partially 
responsible for women's greater work participation and their 
lower fertility patterns. This has been mentioned by 
several researchers (Kettie, 1980; Grindstaff, 1985) but it 
is most conclusively demonstrated by Robertson and Roy 
(1982) in their analysis of the relative income hypothesis. 
Relative income, or the ability of young adults to live in 
the style to which they had been accustomed prior to 
marriage, i.e. their income earning capacity relative to 
that of their parents, has declined as a result of the entry 
of the baby boom generation into the labour market. As a 
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result, the labour force participation of young people has 
increased. In circumstances of relative economic hardship, 
lower fertility is a more probable strategy than the 
contrary. 
In spite of these arguments for continuing low fertility 
patterns in Canada, the possibility of fluctuations must also be 
considered. Easterlin (1961: 1968; 1978) has argued for the 
existence and persistence of natural cycles in fertility with 
women from large cohorts producing fewer children than women born 
in small cohorts. The low fertility patterns of Canada's "big 
generation" seem to substantiate this thesis. The substantial 
drop in the birth rate during the 1960's will result in a smaller 
youthful population entering the labour force, competition will 
be less than that experienced by the preceding generation, and 
economic circumstances should be relatively improved. This could 
produce lower labour force participation rates, as the need for 
youth to work to maintain living standards at the level to which 
they are accustomed will be reduced. According to this scenario, 
fertility could also increase among the "baby bust" generation, 
as fewer women are compelled to enter the labour force to make 
ends meet. 
On the other hand, unless present policies change 
dramatically, the aging population will at the same time place 
heavy demands upon this generation for its support, an important 
consideration mitigating against the high fertility - low labour 
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force participation hypothesis. Moreover, even if fertility does 
increase somewhat among the offspring of the big generation, the 
chances of it becoming very different from present trends seem 
distant. In a recent analysis of cohort fertility in Canada, 
Needleman (1986) makes the important observation that the baby 
boom came about not as a result of a shift in taste for large 
families but rather because of the increase in the number of 
families having one, two and three children. The baby boom 
occurred, therefore, because a larger percentage of the 
population had some children, rather than because of any increase 
in overall family size. The analogy for members of the baby bust 
generation would likely be an increase in those having one or two 
children, as opposed to none or one, with the result that overall 
population growth would continue to be low. 
III (b) Policy implications of future fertility in Canada 
For the most part, Canadians have not seemed particularly 
concerned about the possible implications of current and 
continuing low fertility levels. The exception is the province 
of Quebec which has recently published an analysis of the social, 
economic and demographic consequences of current provincial 
fertility trends. Much more pronounced, however, has been the 
concern of many Eastern European countries where explicit 
policies have been adopted to stimulate couples to produce more 
children. In France, too, the decline in fertility has elicited 
government concern and a study has been undertaken to investigate 
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various methods of arresting this decline. (Romaniuc, 1984) It 
is therefore timely that the Canadian government has recently 
demonstrated concern about Canada's demographic future and its 
relationship to economic and social development. 
One of the important questions to be investigated concerns 
the advantages and disadvantages of a stationary or slowly 
declining Canadian population. Some maintain that Canada's 
economic prospects would suffer from shrinking domestic markets 
and a smaller labour force. Others emphasize the advantages, 
such as the social and environmental benefits of less crowding, 
the potential for increased automation and productivity and the 
challenges of maintaining a healthy national economy. However, 
with the coming of the 1990's many of the problems outlined 
earlier, including fewer young people entering the labour force 
and forming new households, the problems of an aging population, 
and the declining demand for housing and related industries, are 
likely to lead Canadian policy-makers to seek ways of rebuilding 
the nation' s eroding demographic base. While Canadians have a 
ready instrument for increasing population through raising 
immigration levels, the costs and benefits of large-scale 
increases, in economic, social and demographic terms, need to be 
carefully we ighed . 
What incentives could be employed to motivate Canadians to 
have more chiidren? Even assuming that immigration levels are 
increased as a matter of deliberate policy the Government may 
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also favour encouraging Canadians to have larger families. 
Policies which could perhaps stimulate this outcome include 
better arrangements for child-care, extended maternity leave, 
more generous family allowances, renumeration for housewives, and 
more flexible working arrangements including opportunities for 
part-time employment. 
A survey conducted in Quebec in 1976 questioned women 
concerning their perceptions of such policies. The respondents 
favoured measures which would allow women to reconcile their dual 
aspirations of career and motherhood by economic reforms such as 
those mentioned above. Their concerns reflected "not so much the 
outgrowth of a pro-natalist leaning, but rather ... concern for 
social equity, and the recognition that childbearing is an 
important social function that should be rewarded." (Romaniuc, 
1984:109) Thus, it seems clear that any policies which seek to 
induce Canadian women to higher fertility will have to take their 
dual role of mother and worker into account. Assisting and 
reinforcing female labour force opportunities may be the most 
effective means of securing positive attitudes towards family 
formation. 
In his important work on the opportunity costs of marriage 
and childbearing, Breton is not content to see motherhood 
compensated for in the ways suggested above. Even with the 
addition of such measures, he argues men will continue to enjoy 
economic superiority because of women's birthing, nurturing and 
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rearing responsibilities. Only if farsighted policies are 
introduced to allow men and women to share these responsibilities 
can greater equality in the work force be attained. Such 
policies would include paternity leave and part-time jobs for men 
and women so that both can enter the labour force on a part-time 
basis and devote more time to child-care. Parenting in lieu of 
mothering would be the observed pattern, on average." (Breton, 
1984:23) 
Finally, policies will be required to cushion the shock of 
the aging of the "big generation", alluded to earlier. The 
severity of the tax burden on the working population in the early 
part of the next century will depend on a variety of factors, 
including labour foce participation, unemployment, productivity 
performance, economies of scale in the provision of services to 
the elderly and the ease with which resources can be transferred 
from programs designed for the young to those tailored for the 
aged. (Foot, 1982) A continuing increase in female labour force 
participation could be an important element in the welfare of 
Canada's future elderly: if it continue to increase, a larger 
working age population will be available to support the aging 
generations. 
- 21 - 
The nature and variety of the demographic issues highlighted 
in this paper illustrate the significance of fertility in 
determining Canada's demographic, social and economic future. 
The search for creative policies to most effectively address the 
challenges imposed by this complex web of interrelationships 
remains a major task for future research. 
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